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CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE, INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS, AND THE PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE
LUKE MEIER *
INTRODUCTION
Let us assume that the Supreme Court will eventually determine
that public school teachers do not violate the Constitution when they lead
their class in reciting the Pledge of Allegiance, as currently written to
include the words "under God." Indeed, it is probably not that much a
leap of faith. The Court has intimated numerous times before that the
Pledge is constitutional.' Justice Thomas has written an official opinion
expressing the view that the Pledge is constitutional,2 while Justice Scalia
has made unofficial comments indicating that leading school children in
the recitation of the Pledge does not violate the Establishment Clause.3 It
seems highly likely that new Court members Justice Alito and Chief
Justice Roberts would tend to view the issue similarly to Justices Thomas
and Scalia. Justice Breyer has opined, in another case, that the absence
of an Establishment Clause challenge over a period of forty years
indicates that no unconstitutional state religious "message" is present.4
Furthermore, Justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg are surely not
unaware of the political consequences of a Supreme Court decision
ruling that teachers cannot lead school children in the Pledge as currently
written, and it is perhaps not a coincidence that these Justices seemed
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, University of Nebraska-Lincoln
College of Law. I would like to thank Rick Duncan for his comments and assistance
in preparing this piece.
1. See David A. Toy, The Pledge: The Constitutionality of an American Icon,
34 J.L. & EDUC. 25, 59-61 (2005) (discussing Supreme Court dicta indicating the
constitutionality of the Pledge).
2. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 45-54 (2004)
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
3. See Suggestion for Recusal of Justice Scalia at 3, Newdow v. U.S. Cong.,
540 U.S. 962 (2003) (No. 03-7).
4. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2870 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
perfectly happy to avoid the merits of the case in their presidential-
election-year decision in Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow.
5
Given these circumstances, it seems highly unlikely that the Pledge
would be declared unconstitutional by the current Court. Of course, not
all constitutional scholars would agree with a Supreme Court decision
6
upholding the Pledge. Indeed, despite the Court dicta indicating the
constitutionality of the Pledge, the Ninth Circuit (or, at least, two Judges
on the Ninth Circuit) concluded that the Pledge was unconstitutional in
Newdow by applying the various modem tests the Supreme Court has
used in Establishment Clause cases.7  On this point, at least, Justice
Thomas agreed in Newdow with the Ninth Circuit: the Pledge was
unconstitutional under modem Court doctrine.8
If, however, we assume the Court's conclusion that the Pledge is
not unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause, we can jump ahead
to the more interesting question as to how the Court will reach this
conclusion. There are two basic options. The first is to attempt to get to
this result by working within the framework of existing Supreme Court
doctrine. This was the approach taken by Justice Rehnquist in Newdow,
distinguishing between the unconstitutional coercion of a "religious
exercise" in Lee v. Weisman9 and the Pledge, which for Rehnquist was
not a religious exercise.1°
The second option in concluding the Pledge is constitutional is to
work outside existing doctrine. There has been a substantial amount of
scholarship in the last two decades arguing that the Establishment Clause
should not be incorporated against the States. As will be discussed in
Part II, this current academic debate over the incorporation of the
Establishment Clause centers mainly on whether the Establishment
Clause should be viewed as a structural provision or, instead, as a clause
which protects individual rights or liberties. Under the structural view of
the Clause, the primary purpose of the Clause is to prevent the national
5. Newdow, 542 U.S. 4.
6. See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, "Under God, " the Pledge ofAllegiance, and Other
Constitutional Trivia, 81 N.C. L. REv. 1865, 1924-25 (2003) (concluding that the
Constitution threatens to be "trivialized" unless the Pledge is struck down).
7. Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 328 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd on other
grounds, 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
8. See Newdow, 542 U.S. at 49 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
9. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
10. See Newdow, 542 U.S. at 18 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
2006] PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE
FIRST AMENDMENT LA W REVIEW
government from interfering with the states' ability to establish religion
as the citizens of that state may wish."l Under this structural view,
obviously, incorporation of the Establishment Clause against the states
makes little sense. Incorporation would prevent exactly what the Clause
was designed to protect: state establishments of religion. If the
Establishment Clause is viewed as protecting individual rights to be free
from government involvement with religions, however, incorporation of
the Clause makes total sense.
That there could be such fundamental confusion, at this point,
regarding the proper understanding of a clause in the Constitution is
surprising. Nevertheless, the confusion does exist. My goal in this
Essay is to look at one isolated piece of the puzzle: Supreme Court case
law and how the Supreme Court has tended to view the Establishment
Clause when deciding actual cases under the Clause. Based on the
remedies the Supreme Court has fashioned in actual cases litigated under
the Establishment Clause, and based on the standing rules the Court has
used -in Establishment Clause cases, I conclude that the Court has tended
to view the Clause as more of a structural provision rather than as a
clause protecting individual rights.
In Part II of this article, I will briefly summarize the current
academic debate regarding incorporation of the Establishment Clause. In
Part III, I will consider the remedies the Supreme Court has implemented
in actual cases when the Court has found a violation of the Establishment
Clause. The Court's consistent practice in these cases is to strike down
the statute in question on its face, rather than as applied to the facts of a
particular case, suggesting that the Court views the Establishment Clause
as more of a structural limitation rather than a protection of individual
rights. In Part IV, I will look at the standing rules governing
Establishment Clause cases. Although the evidence here is not as clear, I
once again conclude that the Supreme Court's rules regarding standing in
Establishment Clause cases lean towards viewing the Clause more as a
structural guarantee rather than a protection of individual rights or
liberties.
11. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J.
1131, 1157-58 (1991) (arguing that the Establishment Clause protects the rights of
state governments as against the federal government and therefore cannot be
incorporated).
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I. THE CURRENT ACADEMIC DEBATE
In his concurring opinion in Newdow, Justice Thomas indicated
that adherence to Lee v. Weisman12 and other Supreme Court precedent
would require the Court to conclude that the school's policy of saying the
Pledge every morning was unconstitutional.' 3  However, for Justice
Thomas, this fact simply illustrates the need to rework existing doctrine.
The challenge for Justice Thomas and others who would find the Pledge
constitutional by "rethinking" existing doctrine is to articulate a new
standard for determining Establishment Clause challenges. Based on
Justice Thomas' opinions in both Newdow and Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris14 it seems clear that, if the slate were clean, Justice Thomas would
reject any incorporation of the Establishment Clause. The slate, of
course, is not clean, and there is over sixty years of Supreme Court
jurisprudence that assumes the application of the Establishment Clause to
the states.
In light of this rather extensive Supreme Court history indicating
that the Establishment Clause is incorporated against the States, Justice
Thomas has begun to expound a view that would provide for
incorporation of the Establishment Clause against the States, but in a
very limited manner. In Newdow, and previously in his concurring
opinion in Zelman, Justice Thomas suggested that the Establishment
Clause applies to the States only when there is state action somehow
implicating an "individual religious liberty interest." 15  It appears,
however, that there are very few cases in which Justice Thomas would
conclude that an Establishment Clause claim would implicate an
individual religious liberty interest. In Newdow, an individual liberty
interest was not implicated, according to Justice Thomas, because
students who did not want to recite the Pledge could simply opt out and
• • • 16
refrain from participating. Thus, Justice Thomas seems to define
individual religious liberty interests in terms of being free from state
coercion to participate in religious activities. If actual state compulsion
12. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
13. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 45-49 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
14. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
15. Id. at 679 (Thomas, J., concurring); Newdow, 542 U.S. at 49-50 (Thomas,
J., concurring in the judgment).
16. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 46-47 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
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to participate in religious activities is the relevant barometer, it seems
that there are very few cases in which Justice Thomas would find an
Establishment Clause violation. Indeed, Justice Thomas has
acknowledged both that "[t]he Establishment Clause does not purport to
protect individual rights"1 7 and that his incorporated Establishment
Clause might simply mirror the requirements of the incorporated Free
Exercise Clause. 18
Justice Thomas has been criticized for his failure to take• •,,19
incorporation "seriously. His views, however, seem to be heavily
influenced by the quite serious scholarship on incorporation by Yale law
20professor Akhil Amar. In a series of thorough articles and finally a
book on the topic, 21 Professor Amar presents an understanding of the
original Bill of Rights (including the Establishment Clause) and the
Fourteenth Amendment that stands in stark contrast to what he describes
as the "conventional wisdom ' 22 understanding of the Bill of Rights and
how those Amendments apply to the states. The conventional wisdom
regarding the Bill of Rights holds that the rights it guarantees serve to
protect minorities in society against governments controlled by
23
majorities. This understanding of the Bill of Rights is flawed, says
24Amar. The Founders were much more concerned with a non-
responsive, Leviathon-like government that suppressed the liberties of all
25
citizens. In other words, the fear the Founders were addressing when
they created the Bill of Rights was not a government that was too
17. Id. at 50 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (alteration added).
18. See id. at 53 n.4 ("It may well be the case that anything that would violate
the incorporated Establishment Clause would actually violate the Free Exercise
Clause.
19. See James A. Campbell, Note, Newdow Calls for a New Day in
Establishment Clause Jurisprudence: Justice Thomas's "Actual Legal Coercion"
Standard Provides the Necessary Renovation, 39 AKRON L. REV. 541, 568 n.180
(describing academic criticism of Justice Thomas's incorporation views).
20. See Akhil Reed Amar, Some Notes on the Establishment Clause, 2 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 1 (1996); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193 (1992); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of
Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991).
21. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION (1998).
22. See Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, supra note 20, at 1132.
23. See id.
24. Seeid. at 1132-33.
25. See id.
majoritarian; instead, the fear was that government would not be
majoritarian enough.26
After articulating his framework for understanding the Bill of
Rights, Amar proceeds to explain that many provisions in the Bill of
Rights are not, actually, "rights" at all. Rather, they are structural
provisions that seek to limit the power of the newly created federal
government, often times in favor of States. 27 The Establishment Clause,
28
according to Amar, is one such structural provision. Although some
Founders, particularly James Madison, clearly believed in a strict
separation between church and state, this was not the primary impetus for
29the Establishment Clause. The Clause was designed to keep the federal
government out of the area of religion so that States could establish
religion as they saw fit.30 Thus, the Clause is not so much a protector of
individual rights as it is a structural limitation on the federal government,
with the States (rather than individuals) being the primary beneficiary of
the Clause.3' Once one accepts this interpretation of the Establishment
Clause, it seems that the Clause has more in common. with other clear
structural provisions found in the original Constitution, such as the
Interstate Commerce Clause, than with some of the clauses of the Bill of
Rights which clearly do protect individual rights, such as the criminal
procedure protections found in the Fourth Amendment.
Because of the structural and federalism nature of the
Establishment Clause, Amar concludes that the Establishment Clause is a
poor candidate for incorporation unless "the Establishment Clause had
come to be viewed as affirming an individual right against
establishments rather than an agnostic federalism rule."32  Various
scholars have attempted to justify incorporation by claiming that anti-
establishment had, in fact, come to be viewed as an individual liberty.
Professor Lash has argued that incorporation of the Establishment Clause
is legitimate because the Establishment Clause had come to be
understood in the first half of the century, particularly by state judges, as
protecting individual rights against establishment, regardless of the
26. See id.
27. See generally id at 1138-82.
28. See id. at 1157-61.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See Amar, Some Notes on the Establishment Clause, supra note 20, at 5.
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33government involved. In addition, because individual rights to non-
establishment had been "trampled" on in the antebellum South, the
founders of the Fourteenth Amendment clearly meant to apply the
Establishment Clause, as it was then understood as protecting individual
rights against Establishment, to the States.34 Imminent religion law
scholar Douglas Laycock has made a similar conclusion regarding
whether the Establishment Clause does, in fact, protect an individual
right rather than simply being a structural limitation:
A taxpayer objecting to such a tax [to support a
state-sponsored clergy] would be asserting a claim
of individual right under the Establishment Clause.
That right is a privilege or immunity of citizens of
the United States, as readily incorporated as any
other provision of the Bill of Rights . . . .[T]he
claim that [the Establishment Clause] protects no
individual rights is, in my judgment, false to
constitutional text and structure.35
Thus, the current academic debate over incorporation, as
reflected in Justice Thomas's opinions in Zelman and Newdow, is
whether, and to what extent, the Establishment Clause can be viewed as a
protection of individual religious rights. Justice Thomas seems to
conclude that the Establishment Clause does not protect individual rights,
while those arguing in favor of incorporation, such as Professors
Laycock and Lash, argue that the Establishment Clause does, in fact,
protect individual rights.
II. FACIAL VERSES AS-APPLIED HOLDINGS
When a court decides the merits of a constitutional challenge to a
statute, there are generally two different ways in which the holding of the
court affects the future application of the statute. In some instances, the
statute will cease to have any future validity. In other instances, the
33. Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The Rise
of the Nonestablishment Principle, 27 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1085, 1100-36 (1995).
34. See id. at 1136-53.
35. Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, The Pledge of Allegiance, and
Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L.
REv. 155, 242 (2004) (alterations added).
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court's holding on the merits of the constitutional challenge to the statute
will not prevent future, constitutional applications of the statute under a
different fact situation than that before the court when it determined the
constitutional challenge.
Modem terminology describes these two different scenarios
using the terms "facial challenges" and "as-applied challenges." This
terminology is somewhat misleading, for it suggests that it is the litigant
challenging the constitutionality of the statute who controls the breadth
of the court's holding. In some instances this is true,36 but in others it is
clearly not.37 For purposes of this Essay, the manner in which the litigant
argues and briefs the constitutional question is not as relevant as the
actual effect of the court's holding. To clarify this distinction, the terms
facial and as-applied "holdings" will be used instead of the more
common terminology of facial and as-applied "challenges."
What do facial and as-applied holdings have to do with whether
the Establishment Clause should be viewed as a structural provision or as
a clause protecting individual rights? On a theoretical level at least, it
would seem that Supreme Court decisions striking down laws based on a
potential conflict with a structural provision in the Constitution should
more likely be facial holdings. The problem is not that the statute might
apply to the detriment of an individual's constitutional rights; rather, the
entire statute is defective because of a structural flaw. Because of the
structural defect inherent in the statute, there are no valid applications of
the statute. Some commentators have referred to this type of
adjudication as a "valid rule facial challenge." 38 For our purposes, the
36. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 883 (1997) (deciding to analyze
the constitutionality of the Communications Decency Act on its face in part because
the plaintiffs had styled their challenge as a facial challenge).
37. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004). In Lane, the State of
Tennessee's position was that the Court was required to determine the validity of
Title II of the ADA in all of its applications. See Brief of Petitioner, Lane, 541 U.S.
509 (No. 02-1667), available at http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supremecourtbriefs/
02-1667/02-1667.mer.pet.pdf. Nevertheless, the Court decided to look at Title II's
validity as applied to the context of access to courtrooms only. See Lane, 541 U.S.
at 531-35. Similarly, in Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), users and growers of
marijuana for medical purposes argued that Congress lacked the power to
criminalize their specific behavior. See id. at 15-16. The Court, however, was
reluctant to view the issue to be decided so narrowly. See id. at 15-22.
38. See Marc E. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth: Facial Challenges and the
Valid Rule Requirement, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 359, 421-56 (1998).
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important point is that, at least theoretically, challenges based on the
failure to comply with a structural provision in the Constitution would
seem to be more susceptible to facial holdings.
The Court's opinion in United States v. Lopez39 is a great
example of the Court striking down a statute on its face because the
statute was inconsistent with a structural provision of the Constitution.
Lopez involved a challenge to the Gun Free School Zones Act.n° The
defendant in question had claimed that his conviction under the Act
could not stand because Congress lacked authority under the Commerce
Clause to pass the statute.41 All constitutional scholars would probably
agree that the Commerce Clause, which grants Congress the power to
regulate interstate, but not intrastate, commerce is a structural
constitutional provision rather than a provision that protects individual
liberties. Clearly, Congress's power in this area was limited, not because
of the desire to protect individual rights, but rather to preserve this area
of regulation to the States. In Lopez, the Supreme Court concluded that
the statute was beyond Congress's power to regulate interstate
42
commerce, and thus the statute was void in its entirety. Appropriately,
the decision was a facial holding. It did not matter to the Court whether
the actual gun in question had, in fact, traveled in interstate commerce.
Because the challenge was based on Congress's failure to comply with a
structural provision of the Constitution, the statute had to be struck down
in its entirety, even if it could be applied to particular factual
circumstances in which interstate commerce might be implicated.
While it would seem that challenges to statutes based on
structural provisions of the Constitution would tend to require a facial
holding by the Court, as in Lopez, the opposite would seem to hold true
for challenges to statutes based on constitutional provisions which
protect individual rights. If the statute merely violates an individual right
held by the litigant, the proper remedy would seem to be an as-applied
holding; the statute does not apply to the litigant under the facts of the
case, but because there is no structural deficiency in the statute it could
conceivably apply under different circumstances. The constitutional
39. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
40. Id. at 551-52.
41. Id. at 552.
42. Id.
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rights are protected and the Court's opinion has precedential effect, but
the statute is not completely voided.
There is a plethora of language in Supreme Court opinions to
suggest that this model of as-applied holdings in cases involving
individual rights is actually how the Court adjudicates cases involving
individual constitutional rights. For instance, the Court has stated that
"the Court's practice when confronted with ordinary criminal laws that
are sought to be applied against protected conduct is not to invalidate the
law in toto, but rather to reverse the particular conviction. 4 3 Similarly,
the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that "constitutional rights are
personal and may not be asserted vicariously."" And finally, the Court
has famously stated in United States v. Salerno45 that "[a] facial
challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to
mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of
circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.",
46
Not surprisingly, it turns out that actual Supreme Court holdings,
particularly recent ones, sometimes stray from the notion that structural
clauses require facial holdings while individual rights warrant as-applied
holdings. The Supreme Court sometimes strikes down statutes on their
face in cases involving individual constitutional rights, even if some of
the above-quoted language from Supreme Court opinions would suggest
otherwise. The most explicit example of this practice of invalidating
entire statutes even though the constitutional challenge is based on a
clause protecting individual rights is the Overbreadth Doctrine. Under
the Overbreadth Doctrine, a court can strike down a statute as violating
the Free Speech Clause even though there might be applications of the
statute that would not violate any individual constitutional rights to free
speech.47 This practice has been rationalized based on a need to prevent
the chilling of constitutional speech, where speakers might refrain from
engaging in constitutionally protected speech because it violates the
43. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 773 (1982) (first emphasis added)
(citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Edwards v. South Carolina,
372 U.S. 229 (1963)).
44. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610 (1973) (citing McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 429-30 (1961)).
45. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
46. Id. at 745 (alteration added).
47. Luke Meier, A Broad Attack on Overbreadth, 40 VAL. U. L. REv. 113, 113
(2005).
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48language of a specific statute. Even outside the context of the
Overbreadth Doctrine, it is relatively easy to find facial holdings
involving a constitutional provision that clearly protects an individual
49 I
right. There are numerous examples under the Free Speech Clause. In
addition, as many scholars and even some Justices have noted, Court
decisions involving the constitutional individual right to abortion have
almost always involved facial holdings.50
There are also examples in which challenges based on
constitutional structural clauses were adjudicated in an as-applied
holding. The most recent example involves Tennessee v. Lane.51 In
Lane, the Court considered whether Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act 52 (ADA) "exceed[ed] Congress' power under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 3  Clearly, the Enforcement Clause54 of the
Fourteenth Amendment is a structural clause, rather than a clause which
protects individual rights. Nevertheless, in Lane the Court employed an
"as-applied" approach to determining the constitutionality of Title II,
much to the chagrin of some of the dissenting Justices.55 Rather than
determining whether the statute, as a whole, was within Congress's
power, the Court only determined whether Congress could have passed a
hypothetical statute that addressed the particular problem before the
Court.56
Thus, it is apparent that the Supreme Court has not always
followed the seemingly logical approach of issuing facial holdings in
cases involving constitutional challenges based on structural clauses and
as-applied holdings based on individual rights. In a forthcoming Article,
I criticize the Court for straying from this approach and argue that
separation of powers concerns actually require the Court to issue facial
48. See Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003) (citing Schaumburg v.
Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 634 (1980)); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz.,
433 U.S. 350, 380 (1977); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
49. See, e.g., Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S.
150 (2002); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).,
50. See, e.g., John F. Decker, Overbreadth Outside the First Amendment, 34
N.M. L. REv. 53, 91-92 (2004).
51. 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
52. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (2000).
53. Lane, 541 U.S. at 513 (alteration added).
54. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
55. See, e.g., Lane, 541 U.S. at 551-52 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 551.
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holdings when the challenge is based on a structural provision. These
outlying cases, however, seem to be the exception and not the rule. The
fact that almost all Establishment Clause cases have been decided
through a facial holding suggests that the Court has tended to view the
Establishment Clause as a structural provision rather than an individual
rights provision.
To continue with the concept, consider a hypothetical in which
school children are challenging the Pledge of Allegiance under either the
Free Speech Clause or the Establishment Clause and the two different
ways the Court would approach the remedy available under the two
clauses.57 Imagine that there are two children who object to different
parts of the Pledge of Allegiance recited in class. Our first child is John.
As an African-American, John objects to the portion of the Pledge which
states "with liberty and justice for all.",58 John brings suit and makes a
claim under the Free Speech Clause, which applies to the states as a
result of its incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment. The
result of the suit is clear. Under West Virginia Board of Education v.
Barnette,59 John cannot be compelled to recite the pledge. He has a
constitutional right to opt out of partaking in the ritual. However, the
Free Speech Clause does not require the school to refrain from requiring
recitation of the Pledge simply because one student does not agree with
the message. So requiring would effectively give John veto power over
the speech of the school and the other students.
Now consider Jack. Jack is an atheist who objects to the
inclusion of the words "under God"60 in the Pledge. Jack brings suit
under the Establishment Clause. The success of his suit is questionable
under current Court doctrine. However, the remedy if he is successful, at
least under current Supreme Court jurisprudence, is clear: the class is
prevented from reciting the Pledge, at least with the words "under God"
included.
To be sure, the example of John and Jack is over-simplified.
Both children would have the legal ability to bring a claim under the
Establishment Clause and the Free Speech Clause. The simplification,
57. I thank Rick Duncan for this hypothetical.
58. 4 U.S.C. § 4 (2004).
59. 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding that the Free Speech Clause prohibits
compelled recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance at school).
60. 4 U.S.C. § 4 (2004).
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however, serves a purpose, because it pinpoints an inconsistency in the
way these clauses apply to state action. Why should there be a different
(and stronger) remedy under the Establishment Clause than is available
under the Free Speech Clause? Under the Free Speech Clause, a litigant
is not able to silence the rest of the class from reciting a Pledge that he or
she disagrees with or finds offensive. Why should this remedy be
available under the Establishment Clause? If the Free Speech Clause is
not violated so long as the student is not actually coerced into
participating in the Pledge ceremony, why is the Establishment Clause
violated without showing actual coercion to participate in the ceremony?
And why is the remedy under the Establishment Clause not a right to
merely opt out and avoid the ceremony, but instead the right to silence
others?
I would submit that the answer to these questions is that the
Establishment Clause has been interpreted as a structural constitutional
provision instead of a guarantor of individual rights. The remedy under
current Establishment Clause jurisprudence, silencing the entire class,
only makes sense if there is a structural problem in the government
action. If, instead, individual rights are being interfered with, the
constitutional remedy would be an opt-out, as the Supreme Court has
determined in cases involving the constitutionally protected individual
right to free speech.
The response of academics who see a "right" in the
Establishment Clause might be that the Establishment Clause "right"
simply operates in a manner different than, for instance, Free Speech
rights. Under this theory, the Establishment Clause "right" means not
only the right to be free from government coercion in religious activities,
but also the "right" to not be exposed to religious activities and the
"right" to prevent others from engaging in these activities, at least with
government sponsorship. These semantics, however, stretch the word
"right" to its limits. As Justice Thomas acknowledges in his opinion in
Newdow, actual "legal coercion" should be the standard if the
61Establishment Clause is about protecting individual rights or liberties.
And under current Establishment Clause jurisprudence, there are very
few cases in which actual legal coercion can be found. In most of these
cases, the issue is not about a citizen who simply wants to be free from
61. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 52 (2004) (Thomas,
J., concurring in the judgment).
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government compulsion or punishment. Instead, it is about individuals
who want to restrain government from doing something with which the
individual disagrees. This "right" to prevent government from acting is
not an individual right or liberty, at least in the traditional sense.
Government might not have the "right" or authority to enact the law orS62
policy in question, but this is different than government action which
abridges or denies an individual right.
Perhaps the best argument that the Establishment Clause does in
fact protect individual rights is the argument that there is legal coercion
when citizens are coerced to pay, through taxes, for state-sponsored
religious activity. Although the argument is not as relevant to the Pledge
of Allegiance case, in which it is harder to pinpoint the actual monetary
cost to the taxpayers of the Pledge recitation, the argument has more
weight in a case such as Zelman63 involving school vouchers, in which it
is clear that the government activity does have a definite monetary cost.
Even here, however, the argument falls apart when one considers how
this "right" would work in the context of the individual right to free
speech. If the individual "right" protected by the Establishment Clause is
violated when government spends money in a manner contrary to the
religious beliefs of some citizens, then why is it also not a violation of
individual free speech rights when John is forced to listen to his fellow
classmates recite the Pledge of Allegiance and declare America a place
with "liberty and justice for all," even though he disagrees with such a
statement? The "right" to free speech does not extend this far, and
attempting to justify this veto result in the Establishment Clause context
pushes the understanding and definition of "individual right" beyond the
contemporary understanding of the term. Thinking of the Establishment
Clause as a structural provision, rather than as an individual rights
provision, is a much more straightforward and satisfactory way of
explaining the disparity between the veto available to those litigating
under the Establishment Clause and the opt-out right available to those
litigating under the Free Speech Clause.
62. A good example is Congress's Interstate Commerce Clause power. It
might be logical to say that Congress did not have a "right" to pass a particular
statute because of an insufficient nexus to interstate commerce. But it would be
unusual or irregular to say that individuals have a "right" to not have Congress
regulate intrastate commerce.
63. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
III. STANDING
The Supreme Court's complicated jurisprudence involving
standing also provides insight regarding the nature of the Establishment
Clause. Standing is a relatively modem Supreme Court doctrine that is
founded in part in the Article III case and controversy requirement and in
part on "judicially self-imposed limits."64 If standing is lacking, as in the
Newdow case, a federal court will not proceed to the merits of the
66dispute.
To meet Article III standing requirements, a plaintiff must show
that he or she "has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of
the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant. 67 In most instances, the
mere fact that the defendant has engaged in illegal or unconstitutional
68conduct will be insufficient to demonstrate actual injury. Rather, the
plaintiff must show that the illegal or unconstitutional action has
produced actual harm to the plaintiff in a manner different than the type
69of harm suffered by all citizens by illegal or unconstitutional action.
Despite the prohibition on general citizen standing in federal
court to challenge illegal or unconstitutional government conduct, the
Court has at times allowed what is called "taxpayer standing.,
70
Taxpayer standing is based on the notion that there is real monetary harm
when taxpayers are taxed to fund an illegal or unconstitutional
government action, thus satisfying the Article III requirement that there
64. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 11-12.
65. Id. at 4.
66. See id. at ll.
67. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church
& State, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (quoting Gladstone Realtors v. Village of
Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979)).
68. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 62 (1986) ("This Court consistently
has required, in addition, that the party seeking judicial resolution of a dispute show
that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the
putatively illegal conduct of the other party." (internal quotations omitted)).
69. Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S at 472-73.
70. See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). See also 13
CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531.10 (2d ed. 1984) (explaining judicial application
of and limits to citizen and taxpayer standing).
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be actual injury to the plaintiff.71 Because, under this theory, there must
be a link between the illegal or unconstitutional action and the tax
liability of individual taxpayers, it is not surprising that the Supreme
Court has most readily applied this theory to the municipality level. In
challenges by municipal taxpayers to municipal government action, the
Supreme Court had indicated that "the interest of a taxpayer of a
municipality in the application of its moneys is direct and immediate. ' 72
Because a court's decision to terminate a particular government practice
would likely have a real impact on the tax receipts required for the local
government, this link between the taxpayer's individual monetary
interest and the legality of the government program is much tighter. As a
leading treatise explains:
As compared to the size of the federal budget and
current federal habits of legislating on taxing and
spending, it may seem more realistic to assert that
individual tax payments actually are affected by
discrete [local] spending programs. Local tax
rates, indeed, may well be adjusted directly to
73
account for the needs of specific programs.
At the federal level, however, courts presume that federal
taxpayers challenging federal programs will not have a sufficient
personalized injury to satisfy Article III standing requirements: "This
Court has held that the interests of a taxpayer in the moneys of the
federal treasury are too indeterminable, remote, uncertain and indirect to
furnish a basis for an appeal to the preventive powers of the Court over
their manner of expenditure., 74 In regard to state taxpayers challenging
state expenditures, the Supreme Court has been somewhat unclear as to
whether to treat these taxpayers like federal or municipal taxpayers for
standings purposes. When the Court has directly addressed the issue, the
Court has "likened state taxpayers to federal taxpayers" and thus
declined to allow taxpayer standing.75 There are numerous instances,
71. See generally WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 70 (explaining judicial
application of and limits to citizen and taxpayer standing).
72. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486 (1923).
73. See WRIGHT ET AL, supra note 70, at 653 (alteration added).
74. Doremus v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 433 (1952).
75. Asarco Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 613-14 (1989); see also Doremus,
342 U.S. at 434-35 (1952).
2006] PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE
FIRST AMENDMENT LA W REVIEW
however, particularly in cases in which the challenge is based on the
Establishment Clause, where the Court has seemed to concede the
76
standing of the state taxpayer.
Thus, it seems accurate to state that federal taxpayer standing is
generally denied, municipal taxpayer standing is generally allowed, and
state taxpayer standing is somewhere in between. In order to complete
the picture, however, the exception to the prohibition on federal taxpayer
standing needs to be addressed. In Flast v. Cohen,77 the Supreme Court
recognized a very narrow exception to this presumption against federal
taxpayer standing. In Flast, a federal taxpayer was found to have
standing to challenge, on Establishment Clause grounds, the expenditure
78
of federal funds to support religious schools. The Court reasoned that
taxpayer standing was appropriate for two reasons. First, the
Congressional action being challenged was based on the taxing and
spending power enumerated in Section Eight of Article One of the
Constitution.79 Secondly, the challenge was made pursuant to the
Establishment Clause, which was a "specific constitutional limitation[]
imposed upon the exercise of the congressional taxing and spending
power and not simply that the enactment is generally beyond the powers
delegated to Congress by Art. I, § 8."80
The Flast exception to federal taxpayer standing has been
roundly criticized,8 1 and Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans
United for Separation of Church and State, Inc.82 highlighted the limited
extent of the exception. In Valley Forge, the Supreme Court concluded
that federal taxpayers did not have standing to challenge, on
Establishment Clause grounds, the transfer of government property to a
religious college. 83 The property transfer was made by an administrative
76. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 309 (2d ed. 1983).
There are instances in which the Court has assumed federal taxpayer standing as
well. See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 689 (1971).
77. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
78. Id. at 88.
79. Id. at 102.
80. Id. at 103 (alteration added).
81. Id. at 116-34 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
82. 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
83. Id. at 489-90.
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agency, not by Congress pursuant to their taxing and spending power,
and thus the first requirement of the Flast exception had not been met.
84
By strictly limiting the Flast exception to the facts of that case
and the requirements delineated in the Flast opinion, Valley Forge
reduces the vitality of the Flast exception outside the context of the
Establishment Clause. To this author's knowledge, no other clause of
the Constitution has been determined to be a "specific constitutional
limitation[] imposed upon the exercise of congressional taxing and
,. ,,85
spending, and Valley Forge indicates a reluctance to expand upon
Flast. If anything, it seems more likely, given the current disposition of
the Court, that the Flast exception will be further reduced or eliminated
rather than expanded upon. Nevertheless, despite the minimal impact to
taxpayer standing in other areas, the Flast exception is very relevant in
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, at least currently. If the challenge is
to a Congressional action under the Taxing and Spending Clause, and if
the challenge is based on the Establishment Clause, Flast provides for
taxpayer standing in these instances.
What does all of this have to do with attempting to ascertain
whether the Establishment Clause is a structural provision or a guarantor
of individual rights? One commentator has concluded that the Flast
exception lends credence to the claim that the Establishment Clause is a
86
structural provision. I disagree. If anything, recognizing federal
taxpayer standing for Establishment Clause claims (if the challenge is to
Congressional action pursuant to the Taxing and Spending Clause)
bolsters the claims by those such as Professor Laycock that the
Establishment Clause protects individual rights. Indeed, a taxpayer
challenging government spending in support of religion is the very
example that Professor Laycock uses to argue that citizens do have
87individual rights under the Establishment Clause. If federal taxpayers
do not generally have a sufficient personalized injury to have standing to
challenge Congressional action, then allowing taxpayers standing under
the Establishment Clause suggests that there is an individualized harm to
all citizens merely from the fact of a violation of the Establishment
84. Id. at 479-80.
85. Flast, 392 U.S. at 103 (alteration added).
86. See Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on
Governmental Power, 84 IOWA L. REv. 1, 35 (1998).
87. See Laycock, supra note 35, at 242.
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Clause. Indeed, Justice Harlan, dissenting in Flast, even acknowledges
that the majority's opinion rests on an understanding of the
Establishment Clause as protecting individual rights:
Although the Court does not altogether explain its
position, the essence of its reasoning is evidently
that a taxpayer's claim under the Establishment
Clause is "not merely one of ultra vires," but one
which instead asserts "an abridgment of individual
religious liberty" and a "governmental
infringement of individual rights protected by the
Constitution. 88
By stepping back from the Flast exception, however, I think the
Supreme Court's overall standing jurisprudence in Establishment Clause
cases reflects an understanding of the Clause as primarily structural.
Start with cases involving challenges to local or state expenditures by
taxpayers. Although the Supreme Court has almost always found
taxpayer standing to challenge these local or state expenditures, this is
not inconsistent with the Court's general approach to local or state
taxpayer standing outside the Establishment Clause area. As noted
before, the Court has indicated that local taxpayers will most often be
able to establish standing to challenge a local government action in
federal court. And, although the law in regard to State taxpayer
challenges is somewhat unclear, it is fair to characterize these
Establishment Clause decisions in which standing is granted to the state
taxpayer as a decision by the Court to treat state taxpayers as more akin
to local taxpayers. Viewed from this perspective, then, the Court has
found taxpayer standing in an abundance of cases because linking the
expenditure in question to the actual tax bill of the taxpayer demonstrates
individualized harm. If, however, the Establishment Clause actually
protected an individual right against government establishment, the
taxpayer basis for standing would be unnecessary and irrelevant. It
would not be necessary to confirm that the challenger was, in fact, a
taxpayer, because the individual right would be abridged regardless of
whether the plaintiff paid taxes. The denial or abridgment of an
individual constitutional right would constitute a sufficient injury for
88. Flast, 392 U.S. at 125 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing Jesse H. Choper, The
Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools, 56 CAL. L. REv. 260, 276
(1968)).
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standing purposes. But the cases do not say this. When standing in a
challenge to a state or local expenditure is discussed (and sometimes
when it is not), the Court will almost always reference the fact that the
plaintiff is a taxpayer. This discussion would be entirely unnecessary if
the Establishment Clause represented the general "right" to
disestablishment that some claim.
Of course, the above analysis is based on a particular
understanding of cases involving challenges to state and local
expenditures. However, the criticism holds once we move outside the
realm of expenditure cases. Consider those cases in which the plaintiff
challenges not a government expenditure, but rather a government action
that cannot readily be linked with government expenditures and tax
revenue needs. In these cases, if there are no readily identifiable
government expenditures, a theory of taxpayer standing will not suffice.
In these non-expenditure cases, the Court seems to require some sort of
personal connection or exposure to the claimed Establishment Clause
violation. Take, for instance, Van Orden v. Perry.89 In Van Orden,
Austin resident Thomas Van Orden made an Establishment Clause
challenge to a Ten Commandments monument on the. Texas State
Capitol grounds. 90 The monument had been donated and erected on the
Capitol grounds by a private organization, so presumably there were no
state expenditures in buying or erecting the monument. Although
standing was not discussed, the Court detailed in its opinion how Van
Orden frequently encountered the monument when visiting the Capitol.
91
These facts are largely irrelevant to the case except to the issue of
standing. There are other cases in which the Court has seemed to
assume, without discussing, the standing of a plaintiff based on the
plaintiff's personal connection or exposure to the government action in
question. Circuit Courts are often more explicit in discussing this
92personal connection to the government action being challenged.
Requiring some connection to the alleged establishment of
religion is an implicit rejection of the notion that the Establishment
Clause protects individual rights. If individual rights were protected, it
would not be necessary to link the plaintiff personally to the government
89. 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005).
90. Id. at 2858.
91. Id.
92. See, e.g., Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1291-93 (1 1th Cir. 2003).
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action. Rather, the very fact that there was a violation of the
Establishment Clause would be an infringement on this personal right,
and the abridgment of a constitutional right would undoubtedly
constitute a sufficient standing injury. By requiring this individualized
link to the plaintiff, the Court is treating the Establishment Clause like
other structural provisions such as the Interstate Commerce Clause. A
citizen or taxpayer would not have had standing to challenge the
constitutionality of the Guns Free School Zones Act, but when a
particular individual was prosecuted, the Court, in Lopez, was justified in
considering the constitutionality of the Act because standing clearly
existed.
CONCLUSION
Criticism of the incorporation of the Establishment Clause seems
to be gaining momentum, both in the academic world and on the Court.
As it now stands, the academic debate regarding the propriety of
incorporation focuses on whether the Establishment Clause is a structural
provision or a Clause that protects individual rights. The manner in
which the Court has handled the issues of remedy and standing in
Establishment Clause cases suggests that the Court, at least, has thought
of the Clause as a structural provision.
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